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RELATIONSHIP OF ADVISORY OPINIONS -OF
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF J-rSTICE TO
THE MAINTENANCE OF WORLD
MINIMUM ORDER
KENNMET LAWING PENEGAB t
I. CONTEXT, PROCESS OF INTERACTION, BACKGROUND
If the world were organized as well as most of the territorial
polities which make up international society, these comments would
be unnecessary. The fact is, of course, that we live in a very dis-
organized world. The differences among the "community of nations"
have usually been more significant than the similarities and identities.
Nevertheless, men of one nation have moved among those of another,
carrying their ideas and goods with them, to such an extent that it is
no longer accurate to characterize the members of the family of
nations as narcissistic, completely sovereign, or without need from
other members of the family. Communication across continents and
oceans has carried religious beliefs, scientific information, and demands
for goods and services. We may accurately call this process of social
interaction "civilization."
One supreme irony of the ages has been the development of this
"fellow feeling" in apparent juxtaposition to fear of other tribes, races,
and nations, competition for dominance of land and other resources,
and separateness in the building of those social institutions which make
possible what we call "law and order." Yet we hear daily the cry
that in the world community there is very little law and a good deal
less order. Primary attention is given to the periodic outbreak of
hostilities, the fighting of nation against nation, that has cursed
nearly every generation in the modern world. But challenges to this
state of affairs have not been wanting, and the latest response from
man's desire for "peace and security" has taken the form of something
which future generations may perhaps call "the forum of the loquacious
elites," but what we now call the United Nations.
Born in an era of world war, the United Nations is perhaps only
now emerging from an infancy deeply shadowed by the acrimonious
rivalry of the Cold War. Whatever might have been the prospects
of the United Nations-with its rudimentary legislature, its hyphenated
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executive, and its remote tribunal-in a world arena more nearly akin
to the cooperative spirit of the war-time allies, its progress in the
contemporary real world of contending systems of public order' has
not been crowned with the laurel wreath. Yet it has survived, and it
has served the cause for which it was founded. If the "peace and
security" envisioned at San Francisco have not been achieved, at
least we have a kind of peace, a kind of order-albeit one whose
continued existence is precarious because of the overriding threat of
thermo-nuclear war. The nation-states capable of waging such a war,
the so-called great powers, have by their own devices achieved a kind
of stability or stalemate among themselves, but they remain peculiarly
unable to turn back the clock and pick up where they were at San
Francisco. Meanwhile other nations stand in the wings, dreading
the spark which may set off the general conflagration.
The task attempted here at the outset is not to unravel the
gordian knot but simply to describe in outline the context in which
the process of interaction in the world community takes place. A
traditional international lawyer might either condemn or ignore,
depending on his individual assumptions, much of what takes place
in this context. For example, some action is said to be "illegal" as
running afoul preconceived notions about a universal moral code
inductively ascribed to every nation from a European base2 or said
to possess no normative character at all and to have meaning only as
part of the power-oriented "facts of life" of man-in this or any other
age.' If law be regarded as a process of clarifying common interests,
as it will be in the perspective of a policy-oriented study, then the task
1 Several systems of public order exist in the world today. Assertions of a single
universal system are harmful to efforts to build a world community comprising those
who do share the values of human dignity. Unfortunately, little has been done toward
identifying the presently existing systems. A guide for systematic enquiry, however,
is provided by McDougal & Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse
Systems of Public Order, 53 Am. J. INT'L L. 1-29 (1959). See also Kunz, Pluralism
of Legal Systems and International Law, 49 Am. J. INT'L L. 370 (1955).
2 Examples might include the confiscation of a foreign-owned enterprise by the
government of an emerging nation-state, atmospheric testing of nuclear devices, or
shooting down of a foreign reconnaissance plane in the air-space of a particular
nation-state.
3 "Professional lawyers and men of affairs the world over exhibit the most
extreme oscillation between overafirmation of the authoritativeness of what they
term 'international law' and overdenial of the validity of any significant claims put
forward in the name of such a system." McDougal & Lasswell, supra note 1, at 2.
Compare the following representative statements from recent writings. "A number
of great legal philosophers-Hobbes, Pufendorf, Bentham, and Austin are examples
-have all doubted the legal character of international law, and the charges and
counter charges which pervade the international community today seem to provide
empirical support for their view." KAPLAN & KATZENBAcH, THE PoLrrIcAL FOUNDA-
TIONS OF INTE-NATIONAL LAW 5 (1961). "Politically we have for the first time
the formal framework of a universal world order . . . Legally we have for the
first time the formal elements of a universal legal order . . . ." JENKS, THE COM-
MoN LAw OF MANKIND 80 (1958). Dean Acheson, speaking at the 1963 annual
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becomes more complicated.4 It is not a permissible alternative in such
an inquiry merely to deplore the facts of our existence or to explain
them away dogmatically.
As postulated above, contemporary man desires to live in "peace
and security," and this remains the overriding objective of the
United Nations as expressed in its charter. Given such expression,
the human desire can legitimately be translated into a demand, a
demand directed at ruling elites in all nation-states and in every
arena of effective power. This demand constitutes the focus of the
present inquiry. How it has been met in the practice of the inter-
national organizations of the United Nations shall be briefly considered.
While the Security Council had been designed to carry the main
burden of meeting threats to the peace, its usefulness was largely under-
mined by the deep division characterizing postwar international rela-
tions, the so-called "Cold War." "Collective security" was to have
been based upon unity of plan and action among the great powers
represented in the Security Council.' Although the Security Council
meeting of the American Society of International Law said: "In my estimation
. . . the quarantine is not a legal issue or an issue of international law as these
terms should be understood. Much of what is called international law is a body of
ethical distillation, and one must take care not to confuse this distillation with law."
AMERICAN Soc'Y OF INTERNATIONAL LAW PROCEEDINGS 14 (1963). See also ScHIFFER,
THE LEGAL COMMUNITY OF MANKIND (1954) ; SCHWAR ENBERGER, PowER POLITICS:
A STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY (1951).
4 Postulating such a process comprehends a wider context which can also be
referred to as a process-a World social process, "social" because human beings are
the active participants, "process" because there is interaction. And within this
wider context is the daily flow of decisions of all sorts made with respect to various
values or preferred events. Of these decisions those which are at once authoritative
and controlling are the ones which characterize the process known as law. A public
order, then, is defined as those features of the wider context which receive protection
by the legal process. We treat here only a minimum order, by which is meant a
public order built upon the principle that force or highly intense coercion is not to be
used as an instrument of unauthorized change.
The contribution which a policy-oriented jurisprudence makes is contextuality
(with respect to all processes and their inter-relatedness, even though in a given
study widest contextuality may be unnecessary), systematic analysis of multiple factors
affecting decision, along with categorization in terms of more than one value ("power"
usually receives singular attention in traditional approaches), and the performance of
other relevant intellectual tasks such as invention and appraisal (and even reappraisal)
of alternative policies which may be adopted by decision-makers in practice to effectu-
ate clarified community goals.
For this model acknowledgment is explicitly made of the great debt owed to
Professor Myres S. McDougal and his associates. For fuller treatment see Mc-
DOUGAL & FFLIciANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1961) (especially
chapters 1, 4) ; McDOUGAL, LASSWELL & VLASlc, LAW AND PUBLIC ORDER IN SPACE
(1963); McDOUGAL & ASSOCIATES, STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1960) (es-
pecially Introduction and chapters 1, 2, 11, 12). Also of basic interest is LASSWELL
& KAPLAN, POWER AND SOCIETY (1950). Of course these scholars do not share any
responsibility for the particular application of their model in this instance.
5 One writer has recently explained the unanimity requirement with this joint
statement of the sponsoring powers at San Francisco: "'In view of the primary
responsibilities of the permanent members, they could not be expected, in the present
condition of the world, to assume the obligation to act in so serious a matter as the
consequence of a decision in which they had not concurred." GRoss, THE UNITED
NATIONS: STRUCTURE FOR PEACE 39 (1962).
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was not itself meant to be an agency for mediation, arbitration, or
judicial settlement of disputes threatening the peace, it was intended
to set in motion the procedures which would lead to such settlement.'
The same is true of the General Assembly to which more and more
disputes and potentially dangerous situations have been referred be-
cause of the earlier impotence of the Security Council.' Very recent
events have demonstrated, however, the Council's capacity to act when
the direct interests of the large powers do not dictate otherwise. In
March of 1964 the Council voted unanimously to recommend the
creation of a United Nations peace-keeping force for Cyprus.8 The
Congo operation, although spear-headed by Security Council resolu-
tions, involved the Assembly substantially, for example, in its financial
role and in seating of Congo representatives. But perhaps these
cases represent the more acute situations, involving as they did the
use of armed forces to restore order to an area threatening to embroil
an increasingly large number of participants.
In a less urgent situation the United Nations' responsibility
under the charter is to call upon the parties to settle their differences
by resort to one of seven means specified in the charter, viz., negotia-
tion, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement,
resort to regional agencies or arrangements or any "other peaceful
means of their choice." If no settlement is reached, then the United
Nations' second task is to recommend more specific "appropriate
procedures or methods of adjustment." Should a third reference to
the United Nations become necessary, the charter authorizes the
Assembly or Council to lay down terms of a settlement, but still only
by recommending them to the disputants. Only if the dispute con-
stitutes a "serious danger to peace" can more direct action be taken.
But, of course, if the parties consent to United Nations settlement, then
the more direct course may be taken regardless of the seriousness of
the threat to the peace.'
6 See U.N. CHARTER chs. VI, VII where competence to deal with dangerous
disputes and situations is conferred upon the Security Council.
7 Of course the Korean case is unique. There the Security Council acted to give
community backing to United States action when the Soviets had voluntarily ab-
sented themselves.
8 U.N. Security Council Resolution, 19th year, 1102d meeting (S/5575) (1964).
Subsequent events demonstrated that the presence of the force alone was not enough
to guarantee the return of internal order. But United Nations involvement has
apparently had a salutary effect on the attitudes of interested third-party nation-
states-Turkey and Greece in this instance-for even though Turkish forces were
briefly committed on August 8 and 9, the cease fire called for by the Security Council
continues as of this writing. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 11, 1964, p. 1, col. 8.
9 U.N. CHARTER art. 38. See generally Sohn, The Role of International Insti-
ttions as Conflict-Adjusting Agencies, 28 U. CHI. L. Rnv. 205 (1961). The charter
provisions pertaining to the general requirements for peaceful settlement of disputes
by the members of the United Nations are set forth more fully at p. 540 infra.
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Not all disputes, however, are of the kind which lend themselves
to General Assembly or Security Council resolution, nor are those
bodies equipped to handle a flow of involved cases ground from the
plentiful grist of international relations (the process of interaction)
set in the supercharged Cold War context. The charter admonishes
the Security Council, in making recommendations for appropriate pro-
cedures to settle disputes, to "take into consideration that legal disputes
should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International
Court of Justice .... ," 10 Two factors should be noted here in
connection with the Court's involvement in dispute settlement. First,
the relevant charter provisions distinguish between "legal" and "other"
disputes, which the traditional writers take to mean "political.""
Second, the Security Council cannot of its own accord hale the dis-
puting parties into court. Rather the charter provides that the parties
should refer their legal disputes to the Court. Thus there must be
consent to the Court's jurisdiction before a binding judgment may be
made, before a settlement is attempted. The Court in fact acquires
the competence to render judgments in particular contentious cases
either through special agreement of the disputants, notifying the
Court of their agreement, or by an application from one state where
both it and the defendant state have agreed in advance to the Court's
jurisdiction, whether through terms of a particular treaty or by
depositing declarations under the "optional clause." 12 Neither ap-
proach has generated very much litigation in comparison to the number
of tensions and inchoate disputes spawned in the process of interaction
during the first decade and a half of the Court's existence. From 1946
to 1962 forty-eight contentious cases were filed with the Court."3
Only twenty-six judgments have been rendered, 4 however, since several
10 U.N. CHARTER art. 36, para. 2.
11 See, e.g., Sohn, supra note 9, at 230.
12 See generally Jessup, The International Court of Justice and Legal Matters,
42 ILL. L. REv. 273 (1947).
13 See RoSENNE, THE WORLD COURT 218 (1962).
14 Of these only twelve have been on the merits: Case Concerning the Temple
of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), [1962] I.C.J. Rep. 6; Case Concerning
the Arbitral Award Made by the King of Spain on Dec. 23, 1906 (Honduras v.
Nicaragua), [1960] I.C.J. Rep. 192; Case Concerning Right of Passage over Indian
Territory (Portugal v. India), [1960] I.C.J. Rep. 6; Case Concerning Sovereignty
over Certain Frontier Land (Belgium/Netherlands), [1959] I.C.J. Rep. 209; Case
Concerning the Application of the Convention of 1902 Governing the Guardianship
of Infants (Netherlands v. Sweden), [1958] I.C.J. Rep. 55; Amatielos Case (Greece
v. United Kingdom), [1953] I.C.J. Rep. 10; Minquiers and Ecrehos Case (France/
United Kingdom), [1953] I.C.J. Rep. 47; Case Concerning Rights of Nationals of
the United States in Morocco (France v. United States), [1952] I.C.J. Rep. 176;
Haya de la Torre Case (Colombia v. Peru), [1951] I.C.J. Rep. 71; Fisheries Case
(United Kingdom v. Norway), [1951] I.C.J. Rep. 116; Asylum Case (Colombia/
Peru), [1950] I.C.J. Rep. 266; Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v. Albania),
[1949] I.C.J. Rep. 4.
Of the remainder most went to judgment on the basis of a preliminary objection
to jurisdiction or admissibility of the case. Of the total cases filed with the Court
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cases were never argued as the defendant state would not agree to have
the matter subjected to community prescription. Of such a type was
the case instituted by the United States against the Soviet Union,
involving treatment of American aircraft crewmen in HungaryY5
Neither of these great powers had committed itself in advance by use
of the "optional clause." In fact the United States, when it first
acceded to the Court's statute, reserved to itself the right to determine
preliminarily whether any matter which might be brought to the
Court dealt with internal matters and therefore was not for adjudica-
tion by the community tribunal." This practice has unfortunately been
emulated by other states,'1 with the result that only 38 of the 107
members of the international judicial community accept the com-
pulsory jurisdiction.' Two rather large obstacles then are placed in
the way of judicial settlement of contemporary world problems: the
great reluctance of nation-states to concede third-party competence and
the very fact that thus far both the community tribunal and
traditional scholarship have viewed authority based on consent
as an overriding and primary principle. Both of these problems will
have pertinence in a subsequent section on Clarification of Policies.
The charter does provide one additional way for the Court
to become involved in dispute settlement, a less direct way. This
is through the advisory jurisdiction of the ICJ. Unlike the
practice of the United States and certain other national courts,
the World Court is granted competence 'o to render advisory opinions
on "legal questions" submitted to it by the Security Council, the
General Assembly, and specialized agencies and organizations au-
thorized by the General Assembly."0 Thus far twelve requests for
a few have been settled or withdrawn before a ruling could be made. E.g., Com-
pagnie du Port, des Quais et des Entrepots de Beyrouth and Societe Radio-Orient
(France v. Lebanon). Another such case, withdrawn in 1961, was revived in 1962,
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. (New Application: 1962), [1962] I.C.J.
Rep. 310.
15 Case of the Treatment in Hungary of Aircraft of the United States, [1954]
I.C.J. Rep. 103.
16 Interhandel Case (Interim Measures of Protection), [1957] I.CJ. Rep. 105,
is illustrative.
17 France, for example, had so qualified its acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction,
probably to its chagrin after the Norwegian Loans Case, [1957] Lauterpacht's Int'l
L. Rep. 782, 784 (1961) ; but in 1959 France filed a new declaration accepting com-
pulsory jurisdiction and exempting only "disputes relating to questions which by
international law fall exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction," and not as deter-
mined by France. [1959-1960] I.C.J.Y.B. 240.
1 8 
ROSENN,, THE WORLD COURT 83 (1962).
19 U.N. CHARTER art. 96. "The Court may give an advisory opinion on any legal
question at the request of whatever body may be authorized by or in accordance with
the Charter of the United Nations to make such a request" STAT. INT'L CT. JusT.
art. 65, para. 1.
20 "Other organs of the United Nations and specialized agencies, which may at
any time be so authorized by the General Assembly, may also request advisory
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advisory opinions have been made by the General Assembly, two by
specialized agencies (UNESCO and the Intergovernmental Maritime
Consultative Organization) and, not surprisingly, none by the Security
Council, where a veto by a permanent member would be sufficient to
defeat the request.21 In the Assembly, on the other hand, at most
only a two-thirds majority vote is required.
22
Several points require clarification here. First, although the
charter in speaking of the advisory jurisdiction specifies legal ques-
tions, the Court has yet to refuse to give an opinion on this ground
despite specific objections on this point in several instances 3  Further-
more, only United Nations organs, not member states, are granted the
initial competence to invoke this special jurisdiction.2 4  The actual
parties to a dispute, if any, need not be before the Court when the
question is argued. The statute of the Court, however, does require
opinions of the Court on legal questions arising within the scope of their activities."
U.N. CHARTER art. 96(2). (Emphasis added.)
Thus far four United Nations organs have been so authorized: the Economic and
Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, the Interim Committee of the General As-
sembly, and the Committee on Applications for Review of Administrative Tribunal
Judgments. All agencies are now so authorized, with the exception of the Universal
Postal Union which has its own internal system for settling disputes. RoSENNE,
THE WORLD COURT 40 (1962). For a complete listing see [1959-60] I.CJ.Y.B.
This authorization is to be exercised subject to the double condition that no
question concerning the relationships of the agency and the United Nations or other
agency be submitted and that the Economic and Social Council be informed of the
request. ROSENNE, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUsTICE 445-52 (1957) ; ROSENNE,
THE WORLD COURT app. V (1962).
This derivative competence seems necessarily circumscribed by the policy men-
tioned in note 24 infra. Thus the Secretariat, although an integral part of the United
Nations, is not likely to be given the competence to request advisory opinions. On
the other hand some organizations of states like the Organization of American States,
though not specialized agencies or organs, may initiate a request to the General
Assembly (or Security Council) itself to request the opinion. See art. 61 of Or-
ganization of American States (Pact of Bogota), April 30, 1948 [1951] 2 U.S.T.
& O.I.A. 2394, T.I.A.S. No. 2361. Assembly or Security Council discretion in this
area should be limited to questions involving the major purposes of the United
Nations and its particular responsibilities related thereto. See note 9 supra.
21 See [1962-63] I.C.J.Y.B. 40; RosENNE, THE WORLD COURT 93 (1962). There
seems little doubt that such a question would be substantive and nonprocedural, hence
requiring unanimity in the Council. See Sloan, Advisory Jurisdiction of the Inter-
national Court of Justice, 38 CALIF. L. REv. 836-37 (1955).
2 2 There is as yet no definitive answer on the majority required. U.N. CHARTER
art 18 specifies a two-thirds vote for "important questions," but the Assembly has
never decided categorically that all requests for advisory opinions raise an "important
question." For the view that voting will continue to be ruled on an ad hoc basis,
depending on the procedural context, see ROSENNE, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE 478 (1957).
23 See pp. 543-47 infra.
24The underlying policy for this limitation-aside from its complementing the
traditional notion that individual persons have their rights protected through the
offices of their respective nation-states and the assumption that nation-states them-
selves would find their way to the Court under its contentious jurisdiction-is reflected
in this passage from a 1950 special report by the Secretary-General:
The right to present requests for advisory opinions has been conferred
by the Charter .. . only to certain organs which are expected to weigh the
proposal in the light of the general interests of the United Nations as well
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notification to all signatories to the charter or statute of the Court,
thus making available the opportunity to submit a written statement,
to make oral argument, or both, addressed to the question presented.2 5
Furthermore, in one case the Court allowed the views of individual
interested persons to be made available to the Court through the
channels of the organ requesting the opinion.2" Even so, the advisory
opinion remains just that: it is not commonly regarded as "binding,"
as is a judgment in a contentious case, on any state or United Nations
organ." But in practice the organs and agencies concerned have
followed the opinions faithfully.2 "
The range of problems dealt with in this manner is not great, but
the requests made have all been significant both because of the impor-
tance of the subject matter and because competence has been accorded
and accepted by world community decision-making bodies. Treaty
interpretation, United Nations membership requirements, standing of
the United Nations to sue for injuries to its agents, status of League
of Nations' mandated territory, propriety of specialized agency's elec-
tion-all have been dealt with under the Court's advisory jurisdiction.
Furthermore, the Court's opinions themselves have been conspicuous
for their statements accepting third-party competence. In the latest
advisory opinion, the Congo and Middle East operations and United
Nations finance question (1962), a milestone was passed when the
Soviet Union for the first time appeared and made argument in a
judicial setting.-
But severe handicaps to "peaceful settlement" of disputes still
remain. The advisory opinion certainly is no substitute for the
judgment and court order addressed to particular disputants. Where
large world issues are concerned, the machinery for invoking the
advisory jurisdiction is cumbersome and unpredictable since dependent
as in regard to the particular question. During the drafting of the Charter
at San Francisco, the policy was laid down that the right to make requests
for advisory opinions should be restricted to public international organizations
which are part of the United Nations or brought into relationship with it.
The language of article 96(2) was carefully drawn up to express this policy.
ROSENNE, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTIcE 447 (1957).2 5 U.N. CHARTER art. 93; STAT. INT'L CT. JUST. art 66. This access is also
extended to any "international organization considered by the Court . . . as likely
to be able to furnish information on the question. . . ." STAT. INT'L CT. JUST. art.
66, para. 2. Thus, while the right to invoke the Court's advisory jurisdiction is
limited to "public bodies" analogous to officials like attorneys-general in American
state practice, the right to be heard on a question is extended to every member
nation-state.
26Judgments of ILO Tribunal, [1956] I.CJ. Rep. 77.
27 See pp. 555-57 infra.
28 Formal acceptance of the Court's opinion by the organ requesting it may
effectively settle the matter at hand or not, depending on the extent to which action
is required by third-party participants. See pp. 554-55 infra.
29 See N.Y. Times, May 22, 1962 p. 16, col. 3. Certain Expenses of the United
Nations, [1962] I.C.J. Rep. 151; note 101 infra.
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on processes in the larger forum of the Assembly. Indeed the largest
question involving expanded use of the advisory jurisdiction is
whether the General Assembly (and on occasion the other organs and
perhaps some of the specialized agencies) can translate the significant
but everyday questions arising from the current context of the Cold
War into resolutions and requests for opinions which the Court will
feel itself competent to handle. Such questions, however, can be
better posed in the more comprehensive framework of a policy-oriented
study, making use of the other intellectual tasks of goal and policy
clarification, trend description, and appraisal and recommendation of
policy alternatives.
II. PROCESSES AND POLICIES
A. Power Process and Process of Claim
Out of the larger context of social interaction in the world com-
munity with its more or less constant state of flux, wherein are mixed
the raw materials of order as well as confusion, the ingredients of
purpose as well as accident, the observer must find the strands of
relevancy. He must identify entities, events (preferred 3o and histori-
cal), resources, and techniques which operate together as a vital
process--consciously or not-toward some ends which have signif-
icance for public order, and do it in terms conceptually consistent with
and useful to a perspective which deliberately seeks to affect the course
of future conduct.
Actually it is possible to identify two different kinds of such
processes. There is in the factual setting of the world process of
interaction the almost daily series of demands made by major par-
ticipants on other such participants (nation-states). These are made
in pursuit of various objectives, which are identifiable in terms of a
range of values such as power, wealth, well-being, respect, skill, and
enlightenment.3 But the value variable chiefly concerned in a study
specifically related to minimum order is power itself-power in the
multiple sense of access to and participation in the whole set of global
processes, of freedom from intense coercion and relative ability to
withstand minor coercion,2 of ability to control people, resources, and
S3 OBy "preferred event" we mean a value. See note 31 infra and accompanying
text
31 See generally LAssw5ELL & KAPLAN, POWER AND Socmy 16-28, 55-102 (Yale
Law School Studies No. 2, 1950).
32 The distinction lies essentially in the recognition that violent unilateral redis-
tribution of values is wasteful of all values and in the realization that in the con-
temporary poorly organized world arena some competence to resort to permissible
coercion in response is preserved to particular target states and sometimes a collec-
tivity of states. See generally McDouGAL & FELiCiANO, op. cit. supra note 4, at
121-260.
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institutions in the context of the larger framework of the processes
of interaction in the pursuit of other values. These are sought in a
variety of factual situations differing as to relevant detail in a time-
space continuum. In support of these objectives in these varying set-
tings participants have at their disposal certain base or instrumental
values such as control over people, resources, and institutions which
are identifiable in familiar terms of wealth, prestige, and respect.
Practices or strategies employed in these varying situations in
support of certain objectives include categories identifiable as military,
economic, diplomatic, and ideological. The employment may be singly
or in multiples and of varying degrees of intensity. Thus a nation-
state may employ foreign aid and minor coercions in support of a
single objective, although directed at different specific targets.
The outcome of the process may be-again in terms related to
the whole community-a challenge to minimum public order, that is a
resort to severe coercion; or a value change which is neutral or without
visible effect on public order; or the change may consist of a low-order
of coercion, according perhaps with general community expectations.
One long-term effect of this "power process" is to generate other
demands or claims not necessarily counterposed vis-A-vis the identical
objectives in immediate factual terms, but capable of description in
equivalent operational terms of participants, objectives, situations, bases
of power, strategies, and effects.
Participants in this "process of claim" are nation-states and
international organizations which assert the demand for peaceful
settlement of disputes among other states where such disputes rise
to the level of general concern either because of the intensity of commit-
ment by one or both sides or because of the extent of involvement
among the membership of the community.
33
Objectives sought are those which relate in the broadest sense to
the principle that states, like individuals, seek to maximize their values
(of security, wealth, well-being, and so on) and in a more restrictive
sense those related to shorter-range goals of preventing coercion and
violence across state lines as more conducive to a more economic
production of those values.
33 The prime actor in the interactions of the social process transcending state
lines is of course the individual human being who acts in many different roles, un-
organized and organized. But in the power process of claim as related to minimum
world order in the contemporary context it would be misleading and unrealistic to
identify individuals as major claimants or participants in any but an indirect and
instrumental sense.
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Situations include a variety of settings wherein conflicting claims
of states develop and, left unresolved, grow more acute. Competing
claims to control a particular piece of territory may be made by two
or more states, for example, or a demand for payment of a state loan
may be asserted and denied; liability for failure to afford protection
of persons or property may be charged and denied, and so on. The
existence of great weapons systems in a few states may give rise to
a fairly universal demand for reduction of forces or arms control, for
the conclusion of agreements, for their faithful execution, and so on.
Base values at the disposal of the claimants relate principally to
the wielding of persuasive influence. These values include enlighten-
ment, skill, prestige or respect, rectitude, and, of course, control over
people, resources, and institutions.
Strategies employed in the process are diplomatic, economic,
and ideological. Primary emphasis, of course, is placed on those
particular procedures which traditionally have been conducted among
foreign offices and international governmental organizations. The
modality may be formal or informal, but the cooperation becomes in-
creasingly tangible, as with the development of a new nation-state's
resources, and at -the same time more verbal as the claimants articulate
their philosophical preferences to the whole community.
Outcomes may be the amicable settlement of disputes by voluntary
means or by appeal to community decision-making, in which case the
effect is to bolster the process of authoritative decision. At any rate,
the more usual outcome is invocation of the process of authoritative
(and/or effective) decision in the world arena.
B. Clarification of Policies
At the highest and most general level we postulate a world public
order of human dignity as an overriding and ultimate goal, an order
in which all values are widely shaped and shared and in which
private choice is emphasized over coercion as the main modality of
power. 4 Related to this long-range goal, at a slightly lower level, is
the middle-range goal of a minimum world public order, or one in
which persuasion is preferred to coercion as an instrument of policy,
but where the exercise of coercion tends to be increasingly the result
of world community prescription and application rather than a response
to the exclusive short-range interests of various major participants or
nation-states. Again at a slightly lower level of abstraction, but
3 4
McDouGAL & AssocIATEs, STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 16 (1960).
540 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
directly related, is the more immediate goal set out in the United
Nations Charter-"maintenance of peace and security" by resort to
peaceful settlement of disputes. Of particular relevance here are two
provisions of the charter: article two, paragraph three, which imposes
on members the duty to "settle their international disputes by peaceful
means in such a manner that international peace and security, and
justice are not endangered," and article one, paragraph one, declaring
as a major purpose of the United Nations "to bring about by peaceful
means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international
law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations
which might lead to a breach of the peace .... "
The secondary policy, expressed in this latter charter provision,
of conforming to principles of justice and law suggests recourse to
third-party decision-making as the most desirable modality. Thus
we expressly state a policy of encouraging third-party or judicial
settlement, at the same time discouraging the practice of self-judgment
so common in traditional international law and still prevalent in the
contemporary world arena. A concomitant policy is often expressed
in terms of "expanding the Court's jurisdiction." A less radical
expression might be that where authority is to be achieved gradually
and in response to custom-as in a disorganized world arena-
utilization of existing institutions and institutionalized practices should
be greatly encouraged both as an exercise in developing authoritative
practices as an end in itself and as a means toward achieving shorter-
range objectives such as the peaceful conclusion of a particular dispute,
the clarifying of community policies, or the discovery and expression
of common interests. Confronting such a policy is the fact that third-
party competence rests in traditional international law on consent of
the nation-state disputants " and the fact that states have been most
reluctant to accord such competence to community tribunalsY6  How-
ever valid the consent principle may be in the contemporary context-
and we do not reject it out of hand, but neither do we accord it a fixed
place of honor among alternative principles of operation-the con-
tinued utilization of the advisory jurisdiction of the ICJ need not of
necessity run counter to it. Contentious cases will reach the Court
only if the parties consent. But the community's greater need to
have expressions of clarified prescription should not be gainsaid by
35 See pp. 533-34 supra.
3 6 Professor McDougal writes that this reluctance "derives quite obviously from
concern for both effectiveness and the will of the governed." McDOUGAL & Asso-
CIATES, op. cit. mtpra note 34, at 263. But he goes on to cite two advisory opinions
of the ICJ as casting doubt on the "continuing authority of the principle of consent,"
agreeing with Lauterpacht on the point. Id. at 191 nn.69 & 70.
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insistence that every such clarification should await an application as
well. Indeed some current commentary suggests that the chance for
growth in community authority depends upon the "extent that the
advisory function of the Court is drawn upon . . . The possibilities
which lie in that direction have hardly been explored, let alone
exploited." 37
C. The Process of Authoritative Decision
Complementary to the process of claim and in light of clarified
community goals it is possible to identify another process. This
is the process of authoritative decision which in combination with the
process of claim provides focus for a systematic overview of that part
of the whole process of interaction most relevant to the tasks of the
international legal observer. Although a comparable scheme of who,
where, with what values, etc., is employed, the emphasis here is on
functional outcomes which are utilized with fewer base values available
to more self-conscious elites in fewer but perhaps more inclusive and
more visible arenas or forums.
Decision-makers are the members of the General Assembly, the
Security Council, the governing bodies of the specialized agencies, and
the judges of the International Court of Justice.
Objectives sought relate principally to achievement and mainte-
nance of minimum order in the world community through settlement
of international disputes by peaceful means, as prescribed in the
charter. While the establishment of basic order across state lines
encompasses a range of more specific security goals,38 the aim of most
concern here is prevention of potential breaches of public order "by
bringing about conditions calculated to predispose effective decision-
makers to noncoercive, nonviolent, strategies of change . . . . ,39
External structures of authority include the principal organs of
the United Nations and the ICJ, plus the United Nations' specialized
agencies which initially characterize the issues on invoking the judicial
prescriptions of the Court. Internal structures of authority include
37 Gross, Some Observations on the International Court of Justice, 56 Am. J.
INT'L L. 33, 61 (1962). On the other hand at least one writer has complained that
the possible "substitution of the advisory jurisdiction for the contentious" would be
"a real distortion of the true function of the Court." ROSENNE, THE WoRLD CouRT
90 (1962).
38 These are identifiable in terms of prevention, deterrence, restoration, rehabili-
tation, and reconstruction. See generally McDOUGAL & FELICIANo, op. cit. sqpra
note 4, at 261-383.
39 Id. at 263.
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the traditional foreign offices, executive councils, and legislative bodies
of the territorially-organized bodies politic called nation-states.
Bases of power or base values most relevant in the contemporary
context to decision-makers in the external structures of authority are
those which reinforce formal authority itself-respect, enlightenment,
loyalty, and rectitude.'
Strategies or instruments of policy realistically available to
decision-makers in external structures of authority concentrate on
diplomatic and economic means, and primarily on the former.41 Al-
though the ideological instrument is not consciously employed (the
United Nations' agencies speak to governments and not to individuals,
at least formally), there is a display of symbols in certain actions of
the United Nations (such as dispatch of national troops in United
Nations' colors) and in certain documents (such as the Court's ad-
visory opinion itself), which while primarily directed at decision-
makers in arenas of effective power must necessarily condition in
some measure the predispositions of a wide range of participants in-
cluding parties, pressure groups, and individuals.
Outcomes involve seven authority functions wherein the several
levels of decision-makers undertake at various points in time to form
and apply community policy. These include intelligence or information
gathering undertaken both by officials of the United Nations and the
judges on the Court in either formulating or considering a particular
dispute or problem. This function, of course, leads to the recom-
mending done both by United Nations officials again and those states
which make arguments to the Court. Articulation of community
prescription is done not all at once or by any one group of decision-
makers, but rather proceeds from the practice of the United Nations
under the charter and the decision-making of its officials and the
judges of the ICJ. A sufficient majority of United Nations members
may invoke the process by which the Court renders advisory opinions,
the Court coming then to apply the community prescriptions. Ap-
praisal and termination of the consequences of policy prescriptions and
4 o Nothing need be said here about the base values available in internal structures
except this reminder: "Nation-states continue to reserve to themselves control, by
unilateral and exclusive decision, over most of the important bases of effective power
which can be employed to sustain general community authority. This is most obvious
with respect to control over resources (territory, technology, etc.), people (residents,
armed forces, etc.), and the institutional practices of the territorial community by
which values are shaped and shared." Id. at 358-59.
41 So far only token use of the military instrument has been possible. Unless
we include the Korean action, only the emergency forces sent to the field by the
United Nations may be cited in this context.
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
applications again are the responsibility of the collectivity of community
decision-makers, seeking more enlightened future prescription and
application.
As major participants in the whole process of interaction are
brought to pattern their conduct according to the applied prescriptions
of the community, the result is a tendency to build a community in
fact, bringing about changes in predispositional and environmental
factors influencing ruling elites in favor of greater inclusivity of
objectives, increasing thereby the very authority of the community
process initially invoked. One short-range effect is to generate the
expectation (in the wider social context) of compliance with the
Court's opinion at least by the invoking body and to a lesser extent
by other participants not directly involved.
III. ADvisoRY OPINIONS AND THEIR EFFECT
A. The Trend of Decisions
The thirteen advisory opinions ' rendered by the Court can be
described and analyzed conveniently, at least for initial purposes,
under such familiar traditional concepts as "legal questions," "domestic
jurisdiction," and "dispute pending." In a subsequent section our
analysis passes to terms more rationally conceived in relation to the
problems of maintaining public order.
1. "Legal Questions" and "Domestic Jurisdiction"
In most of the earlier requests for advisory opinions, the first
and most stringent objection to a reply by the Court was that the
question presented was not a "legal" one.43 Thus, in the very
first request, Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in
the United Nations, Charter Art. 4, the Polish representative in oral
42 Certain Expenses of the United Nations, [1962] I.CJ. Rep. 151; Constitution
of the Maritime Safety Committee of the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative
Organization, [1960] I.C.J. Rep. 150; Judgments of the Administrative Tribunal of
the ILO Upon Complaints Made Against the UNESCO, [1956] I.C.J. Rep. 77;
Admissibility of Hearings of Petitioners by the Committee on South West Africa,
[1956] I.C.J. Rep. 23; South-West Africa-Voting Procedure, [1955] I.C.J. Rep. 67;
Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative
Tribunal, [1954] I.C.J. Rep. 47; Reservations to the Convention on Genocide, [1951]
I.C.J. Rep. 15; Interpretation of Peace Treaties (Second Phase), [1950] I.C.J. Rep.
221; International Status of South-West Africa, [1950] I.C.J. Rep. 65; Interpretation
of Peace Treaties, [1950] I.C.J. Rep. 65; Competence of the General Assembly for
the Admission of a State to the United Nations, [1950] I.C.J. Rep. 4; Reparation
for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, [1949] I.C.J. Rep. 174;
Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations (charter, art 4), [1947-
1948] I.C.J. Rep. 57 (1948).
43 See text accompanying note 11 mipra.
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argument declared that "political motives and considerations and
criteria have guided many [United Nations] representatives in the
discussion and voting on the admission of new Members to the
United Nations." " This assertion was documented as follows: "The
lack of diplomatic relations being an obstacle in one case, was not
invoked when another State was involved; en bloc admission was
considered incompatible with the charter in a case where the similarity
of the cases was obvious, but was advanced at another occasion when
there was no justification for it at all."" Counsel insisted that the
subject of "political" debate in the General Assembly could not subse-
quently become a question fit for judicial determination. But by a
vote of nine to six the Court concluded that it could decide such a
question." In the Court's view, the interpretation of a treaty provision
was involved-"the character (exhaustive or otherwise) of the condi-
tions for admission stated therein"-and consequently a legal question.41
The issue was raised again in another Cold War situation. The
opinion of March 30, 1950, Interpretation of Peace Treaties,48 dealt
with the failure of Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania to appoint com-
mission members to consider charges of violation of human rights, as
provided by the Peace Treaties. Charges made by the United States
against Bulgaria, for example, were quite specific: that that country
had dissolved all opposition political parties, executed named leaders,
4 4 CONDITIONS OF ADMISSIONS OF A STATE To MEx ERSHIP IN THE UNITED NA-
TIONS (ARTICLE 4 OF THE CHARTER)-PLEADINGS, ORAL ARGUMENTS, AND DOCUMENTS
105 (I.C.J. 1948) [hereinafter cited as ICJ Pleadings with date of presentation].
45Ibid.
4
6By resolution of November 17, 1947, the General Assembly had submitted a
request for the Court's opinion on this question:
Is a member of the United Nations which is called upon, in virtue of
Article 4 of the Charter, to pronounce itself by its vote, either in the Security
Council or in the General Assembly, on the admission of a State to member-
ship in the U.N., juridically entitled to make its consent to the admission
dependent on conditions not expressly provided by paragraph one of said
Article? In particular, can such a Member, while it recognizes the condi-
tions set forth in that provision to be fulfilled by the State concerned, subject
its affirmative vote to the additional condition that other States be admitted
to membership in the U.N. together with that State?
ICJ Pleadings 9 (1947). U.N. CHARTER art. 4, para. 1 reads as follows: "Member-
ship in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states which accept the
obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the Organization,
are able and willing to carry out these obligations."
47 Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations, [1947-1948] I.C.J.
Rep. 57, 61 (1948). Thus Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Italy, Finland, Ireland,
Portugal, Rumania, and Jordan all were admitted in accordance with article 4 of the
charter on December 14, 1955. Mongolia came in on October 27, 1961, but along with
Mauretania. En bloc admissions are still the custom, but, as the court has ruled, the
charter does not require such a practice.
48 [1950] I.C.J. Rep. 65. The second phase of the Peace Treaties case is dealt
with in a separate opinion of July 19, 1950, Interpretation of Peace Treaties (Second
Phase), [1950] I.C.J. Rep. 221 (advisory opinion).
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prohibited free publication, and harassed religious groups-all in al-
leged contravention of the Treaty of Peace concluded among Bulgaria,
Hungary, and Rumania on the one hand and the allied powers on
the other. 9 The General Assembly had aired these charges during
its third and fourth sessions, in which the Soviet bloc insisted that
the matters complained of were exclusively within the domestic juris-
diction of these East European countries and were consequently beyond
the competence of the Assembly, under article 2, paragraph 7."o But
the great majority of members were convinced that the Assembly's
competence rested upon article 14, authorizing it to "recommend
measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of
origin, which it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly
relations among nations . . . ." Serious regard for the protection
of human rights--even among new members-could warrant concern
for "the general welfare" and for the "friendly relations among
nations." Discussion about and resolutions inveighing against the
situation in the three countries resulted only in their refusal to comply
with the provisions of the treaties.51 The General Assembly responded
with a resolution asking for an advisory opinion as to whether a
dispute existed between the signatories, and if so whether Bulgaria,
Hungary, and Rumania were obligated to appoint commissioners, and
if they were but did not do so, whether the Secretary-General could
appoint the "third" member." In deciding to reply to these questions
the Court only briefly answered the contention that it lacked com-
petence to proceed because the Assembly's action in making the
request was allegedly ultra vires. To the Court the Assembly's action
was simply a function of the United Nations' promotion, under
article 55, of "universal respect for, and observance of, human rights
49 INTERPRETATION oF PEACE TREATIES WrrH BULGARIA, HUNGARY AND RU-
MANIA-PLEADINGS, ORAL ARGUMENT, AND DOCUMENTS 23-25 (I.CJ. 1950).
50 "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations
to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any
state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the
present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of . . . enforce-
ment under chapter VII." U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7.
51 Interpretation of Peace Treaties, [1950] I.C.j. Rep. 65, 66-68. Articles 36,
40, and 38 of the Peace Treaties With Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Feb. 10, 1947,
T.I.A.S. Nos. 1649, 1650, 1651, respectively provided that the Heads of Diplomatic
Missions of the United States, Soviet Union, and United Kingdom in the three
former enemy countries would settle any dispute not settled by direct diplomatic
negotiations. And if they could not agree, then the parties to the dispute themselves
were each to choose one representative, these two choosing a third person from
another country to form a commission. The Soviet Head of Mission refused to
meet with the other two, so the United States invoked the second procedure. The
three states refused to appoint a commissioner, asserting that no dispute existed.
52The treaty provided for a three-man commission, one each from the two
contracting parties, the third to be named by the other two unless they could not
agree, in which event the Secretary-General was to appoint the third member.
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and fundamental freedoms." 53 The contention that the matter was
essentially within a State's domestic jurisdiction was not tenable,
because
the Court is not called upon to deal in the charges brought
before the General Assembly since the Questions put to the
Court relate neither to the alleged violations of the provisions
of the treaties concerning human rights and fundamental
freedoms nor to the interpretation of the articles relating to
these matters. The object of the Request is much more
limited. It is directed solely to obtaining from the Court
certain clarifications of a legal nature regarding the appli-
cability of the procedure for the settlement of disputes by the
Commissions provided for in the express terms [of the
treaties]. . . . The interpretation of the terms of a treaty
for this purpose could not be considered as a question essen-
tially within the domestic jurisdiction of a State. It is a
question of international law which, by its very nature, lies
within the competence of the Court."
The Court, significantly, took the opportunity to censure national
self-judging of preliminary questions upon which the very competence
of the community tribunal often depends. Thus as to the question
whether a dispute existed in fact, the Court in answering in the
affirmative declared: "Whether there exists an international dispute
,, 55is a matter for objective determination ....
In the second Admissions case,58 where the questions submitted
involved the Assembly's right under the charter to elect members
in the absence of an affirmative recommendation from the Security
Council, the Court grew bolder in the assertion of its advisory com-
petence. The objection had been made that the charter was not subject
to interpretation by the Court and that the question had a "political
character." Relying on its ruling in the first Admissions case," the
Court simply noted that the charter as a multilateral treaty was, of
course, subject to judicial interpretation and that the question itself,
framed in abstract terms, called for nothing more than treaty
interpretation.5'
53 Interpretation of Peace Treaties, [1950] I.C.J. Rep. 65, 66.5 4
1d. at 70-71.55 Id. at 74. The court cited the charges made by the United Kingdom, Australia,
Canada, New Zealand, and the United States, and the denial made by Bulgaria,
Hungary, and Rumania as patently disclosing a dispute. Such a simple formula
seems deceptively facile. Would it suffice-as Cuba argues-to force the United States
to answer in formal proceedings charges of aggression against that island State?
56Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the
United Nations, [1950] I.C.J. Rep. 4.
57Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations, [1947-1948] I.CJ.
Rep. 61 (1948).58 [1950] I.C.J. Rep. at 4, 6-7.
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The treaty involved in a succeeding case, one of the most far-
reaching yet decided by the Court, was the Genocide Convention.
While the United Nations itself was not a signatory, it had indeed
taken the initiative in drafting the compact, opening it for signature,
and so on, thereby creating an interest sufficient to justify the
Court's answering the request for an advisory opinion. 9 The General
Assembly and the Secretary-General (depository for the instruments
of ratification and accession) "have an interest in knowing the legal
effects of reservations to that Convention and more particularly the
legal effects of objections to such reservations." 60 Thus did the
Court dismiss the contention that by interpreting this treaty for the
General Assembly it would in fact be meddling in the affairs of the
actual signatories who had not asked for any interpretation.
In an additional observation which has raised candid comment
about the ICJ's developing advisory competence, the Court asserted
that "a reply to a request for an Opinion should not, in principle, be
refused." 61 That is, the discretionary power of the Court to render
an opinion will not be withheld where two conditions are satisfied;
one, the Court finds that a legal question is presented; and two, the
request comes appropriately from an organ authorized to make the
request and with "a legitimate interest in seeking an opinion in the
matter from the Court." 62 In view of the possibility that an actual
dispute may be pending between States not before the Court, such
assertions have led some commentators, as we shall see below,3 to
fear that other traditional features of jurisdiction and competence may
be threatened or undermined.'
2. Assertion of Further Competence
While in 1950 in the Peace Treaties case the Court was willing
to declare that Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania were remiss in
ro Reservations to the Convention on Genocide, [1951] I.C.J. Rep. 15.
60 Ibid. The principal question presented was: "Can the reserving State be
regarded as being a party to the Convention while still maintaining its reservation
if the reservation is objected to by one or more of the parties to the Convention but
not by others ?" Id. at 16. While the Court begged this substantive issue by declaring
that "if the reservation is compatible with the object and purpose of the Convention,"
id. at 29, then the reserving signatory can be regarded as a party, more importantly,
by giving an answer, the Court continued an unbroken chain of affirmative responses
to requests from the General Assembly for advisory opinions.
61 Id. at 19.
62 See Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice,
1951-54: Questions of Jurisdiction, Competence and Procedure, 34 BraiT. YEAR BooK
INT'L L. 1, 138-39 (1958), for the remark that in this case the Court "carried a stage
farther the already very thorough consideration given by the court to the nature of
its advisory jurisdiction [in the two Admissions cases and the Peace Treaties case]."
03See pp. 548-50 infra.
6
4 1d. at 142-43.
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their treaty obligations, it was not prepared to allow the other parties
to remake the contract to effectuate its substantive provisions. In
1955, however, the Court went beyond a mere declaration of rights
and duties in Admissibility of Hearings of Petitioners by the Com-
mittee on South-West Africa. 5 There the Union of South Africa,
a mandatary under the League of Nations and now responsible in a
similar capacity to the United Nations, refused to assist in the im-
plementation of an earlier advisory opinion.6 As a result, the General
Assembly's Committee was held to have been justified in granting
oral hearings on conditions in South-West Africa as a substitute for
required reports from the mandatary. In a separate concurring
opinion Judge Lauterpacht wrote that such action was in accord with
the principle that a court of law was not powerless to give effect to the
"major purposes of [an] instrument" where one party refused to
act upon it, that it could interpret the instrument as continuing in
validity and as fully applicable "subject to reasonable re-adjustment"
to preserve its effectiveness (in this case, the Court's former ruling
that South-West Africa was subject to United Nations supervision).67
3. "Disputes Pending" and "Absence of Parties"
"The fact that the matters in which the request for an opinion
relates are in dispute between two or more States is not in itself a
ground for refusing to comply with the request." 68 Court practice
has made this a well-established principle regarding its advisory
opinions, as illustrated by the Reservations and the Peace Treaties
cases discussed above. The fear that this trend could undermine the
contentious jurisdiction of the Court is often based on the reasoning
of the older case of Eastern Carelia, decided under the Permanent
Court of International Justice. There the Permanent Court declined
to give an opinion because "the question put to it was directly related
to the main point of a dispute actually pending between two States, 9
so that answering the question would be substantially equivalent to
deciding the dispute between the parties." 7o It has been suggested
65 [1956] I.C.J. Rep. 23.
6 International Status of South-West Africa, [1950] I.CJ. Rep. 128.
6 7 Admissibility of Hearings of Petitioners by the Committee on South-West
Africa, [1956] I.C.J. Rep. 23, 55-56. judge Lauterpacht tried to distinguish the
cases, saying that in Peace Treaties there was no emergency scheme available to
render the commission scheme effective. Quaere whether that is a distinction with
a meaningful difference?
6s8 Fitzmaurice, supra note 62, at 140.
69The two States were Finland and Russia.
7oQuoted by the Court in Interpretation of Peace Treaties, [1950] I.CJ. Rep.
65, 72.
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that the reason for the ICJ's more dynamic assertion of competence
results from the fact that the present Court is more an organ of the
United Nations than the Permanent Court was of the League of
Nations, and perhaps also from article 68 of the statute of the Court
which permits the use of contentious procedure in the consideration
and hearing of requests for advisory opinions." In any case it seems
clearly established that the ICJ will not be deterred from its tasks
by the empty admonition that its pronouncements may "decide the
dispute."
The contention has also been made in argument before the Court
that a decision may prejudice the interests of parties not present at the
hearings.72 However, not only do all members of the United Nations
have the privilege to file written statements or make oral argument, but
in the case of Judgments of the Administrative Tribunal of the ILO
Upon Complaints Against UNESCO,7 the Court actually made
special provision for the interests of individual persons, the UNESCO
officers whose jobs had been restored by the ILO tribunal.7
UNESCO "took an appeal" to the Court to test the ILO tribunal's
competence to hear cases against its sister agency. "The judicial
character of the Court requires that both sides directly affected by
those proceedings shall be in a position to submit their views and their
arguments to the Court," it was said in the opinion.75  Accordingly
the Court had UNESCO, the "appellant," submit the "observation"
of the individuals concerned and furthermore dispensed with the oral
proceedings entirely, thus attempting to equalize the positions of the
real disputants in the case.76 Here, it seems, is an effective alternative
procedure created by the Court to answer a genuine community need.
The right to be heard was not sacrified to the rigidity of a procedural
rule, nor was the request for an opinion on this important adminis-
trative matter withheld.
71 See Fitzmaurice, supra note 62, at 141.
72 REPARATION FOR INJuRIEs SuFFERED IN THE SERVICE OF THE UNITED NATIONs
-PLEADINGS, ORAL ARGUMENTS, DOCUMENTS 93 (I.C.J. 1949).
73 [1956] I.C.J. Rep. 75 (advisory opinion).
741bid.; cf. Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations
Administrative Tribunal, [1954] I.C.J. Rep. 47, 56-57 (advisory opinion).
75 [1956] I.C.J. Rep. at 86.
76Two criticisms have been made of this procedure: (1) the absence of true
equality because the individual's papers go through the agency and not directly to
the Court; (2) the truncation of the Court's procedure, depriving the judges of the
vitality of the oral arguments. See id. at 155, 166-67 (Cordova, J., dissenting);
Gross, Participation of Individuals in Adzisory Proceedings Before the International
Court of Justice, Question of Equality Between the Parties, 52 AM. J. INT'L L. 16
(1958). Gross suggests that the charter be amended to allow international civil
servants direct access to the International Court of Justice, thus preserving equality
while retaining the oral argument. Id. at 35-40.
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Of course, where the rendering of an opinion will not immediately
decide a question upon which depend the rights of a party not in
court, and not capable of being in court, as was the case with Israel in
the Reparations case,77 then the Court does not concern itself with
"observations" from that party. In the Reparations case the issue
presented was whether the United Nations had international capacity
to sue a State for damages resulting from the wrongful death of its
agents in that State. Israel, the potential defendant in such a case,
not being a United Nations member, could not be heard in the matter.
Nor does it seem that such a handicap in any way prejudices a State's
essential rights in a case on the merits yet to be heard in an as-yet-
undetermined forum.
4. Other Substantive Matters
In two other advisory opinions the ICJ has demonstrated its
readiness to continue interpretation of the charter and other treaties,
and of particular administrative procedures related to them. Thus
in 1954 the General Assembly asked whether its votes on reports from
South-West Africa had to be as for "important questions" (requiring
two-thirds majority vote under article 18, paragraph 2).'s In the
second case the Assembly of the Inter-Governmental Maritime Con-
sultative Organization gained an opinion which prevented possible
alienation of the "convenient flag" States from the Maritime Safety
Committee.7 9
By far the most portentious development in advisory opinions
until now dealt with the General Assembly's critical need for au-
thoritative characterization of expenses incurred in recent peace-
keeping missions. By resolution of December 20, 1961, the Assembly
asked the Court whether the expenditures authorized in various General
Assembly resolutions over the years 1956-1959 and 1960-1961 relating
to United Nations' operations in the Middle East (UNEF) and in
the Congo (ONUC) constituted "expenses of the Organization"
within the meaning of article 17, paragraph 2, of the charter.80 The
77 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, [1949]
I.C.J. Rep. 174 (advisory opinion).
78 Voting Procedure in Questions Relating to Reports and Petitions Concerning
the Territory of South-West Africa, [1955] I.C.J. Rep. 67 (advisory opinion).
79 Constitution of the Maritime Safety Committee, [1960] I.C.J. Rep. 150 (ad-
visory opinion). It seems that Liberia and Panama were offended at not being
elected to the committee. The Court interpreted the organizational convention's
provisions about largest ship-owning countries to be equivalent to largest ship-
registering countries, thus assuring Panama and Liberia seats. See [1959-60] I.C.J.
Y.B. 93.
801 CERTAIN EXPENSES OF THE UNITED NATIONS-PLEADINGS, ORAL ARGUMENT,
AND DOCUMENTS 1 (I.C.J. 1962). The pertinent charter clause reads: "The expenses
of the Organization shall be borne by the Members as apportioned by the General
Assembly." U.N. CHARTER art. 17, para. 2.
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Court, by a vote of nine to five, answered that the expenditures did
constitute "expenses of the Organization" I" since "expenses of any
organization are not only ordinary maintenance and administrative
costs but also 'amounts paid out to defray the costs of carrying out the
purposes of the Organization.' as In the words of the Court, the
purposes of the United Nations are achievement of "the goal of inter-
national peace and security and friendly relations" and "the achieve-
ment of economic, social, cultural and humanitarian goals and respect
for human rights" and, finally, "to be a center for harmonizing the
actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends." ' The
Court then examined each General Assembly and Security Council
resolution to determine if the measures voted (both as to field opera-
tions and financing) were in accord with these major purposes. The
Court felt it necessary to separate in its analysis the procedures used
in the Middle East and those in the Congo, for General Assembly
initiative had created 4 and sustained the former effort, while in the
latter initial authorization came directly from the Security Council."
The Court dismissed the contention that UNEF was created for "en-
forcement action" against a State, allowable under chapter VII of the
charter only to the Security Council. UNEF, on the other hand, was
in the nature of a "measure," albeit with some form of action, under-
taken with the consent of the nations concerned and legitimately
cognizable under article 14.86 Furthermore, and more importantly,
the Court concluded from an examination of the resolutions themselves
that the expenses of UNEF "from year to year" had been treated
by the General Assembly as expenses of the Organization, 7 and from
S1 Certain Expenses of the United Nations, [1962] I.C.J. Rep. 151 (advisory
opinion).
8 2 Id. at 158-61.
8
3 Id. at 168.
84 General Assembly Resolution 1000 (ES-I) of November 5, 1956, para. I,
"establishes a United Nations Command for an emergency international force to
secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities . . . ." U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc.
1sT EmER. SPEC. SEss., Supp. No. 1 (A/3354) (1956).
85Resolution of July 14, 1960, U.N. SEcURrrY CouNciL OFF. REC. 15th year,
Supp. July-Sept. 1960, at 16 (S/2508) (1960).8 8 The General Assembly resolutions did not mention the article relied on, but
if one or more of them had specified article 11, wherein appears the provision for
referring to the Security Council questions "on which action is necessary," then the
Court would have faced a harder question. As it was, the Court could assume that
they were based on the more permissive article 14 providing for "the peaceful adjust-
ment of any relation . . . likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations
among nations." See [1962] I.C.J. Rep. at 172. This approach illustrates how
authority not only sustains itself from case to case but also increases itself by being
authoritatively enunciated in cases of general applicability.
s7E.g., Resolution No. 1089 (XI) of December 21, 1956, U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF.
REc. 11th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 46 (A/3572) (1956), passed by the requisite two-
thirds majority, provided that expenses of UNEF, "other than for such pay, equip-
ment, supplies and services as may be furnished without charge by Governments of
Member States, shall be borne by the United Nations ... " (Emphasis added.)
See [1962] I.C.J. Rep. at 174.
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a similar examination of Security Council resolutions that during the
Congo crisis that body had "confirmed, approved, and ratified" ' the
actions of the Secretary-General, thus working a sort of estoppel ' on
those who would contend that the Security Council's prerogative had
been usurped. After all, the Court pointed out, "the Charter does not
forbid the Security Council to act through instruments of its own
choice . . . . " Finally, it was plain to the Court that all these
resolutions-to return to the issue raised at the outset-were directed
toward "carrying out the purposes of the Organization," 9' whether
that meant "[promoting and maintaining] a peaceful settlement"
(language used by the Court in characterizing the Assembly resolu-
tions) or maintaining "international peace and security." '
The long-range significance of this latest advisory opinion does
not lie in the forcefulness or cogency of its reasoning, for it is not a
model in that respect, or even in the result reached, although admittedly
favorable to the United Nation's progress in the peace-keeping area.
Far more importantly it revealed a conception of the Court's role in
the process of authoritative decision which is judicially activistic but
at the same time deferential to the effective role played by the "political"
organs of the United Nations. Thus the Court at the outset of its
opinion took occasion to state, as it had done before in Administrative
Tribunals of the ILO,'3 that only "compelling reasons" should lead it
to refuse a requested advisory opinion and that the "reply of the
Court [to a request for an advisory opinion] represents its participa-
tion in the activities of the Organization, and, in principle, should not
be refused." However, in discussing the nature of "expenses in-
curred for United Nations purposes," the Court gave primacy to the
characterizations initially made by the United Nations organ in
question:
In the legal systems of States, there is often some
procedure for determining the validity of even a legislative
or governmental act, but no analogous procedure is to be
found in the structure of the United Nations. Proposals
8 E.g., Security Council resolution of Aug. 9, 1960, adopted without dissent,
takes note of the Secretary-General's report and "confirms the authority given to the
Secretary-General by the Security Council's resolutions of July 14 and July 22, 1960,
and requests him to continue to carry out the responsibility placed on him thereby."
See [1962] I.C.J. Rep. at 176.
89 The word choice is that of this writer, but see the Court's opinion, id. at 175-77.
90 Id. at 177.
91 Id. at 179.
9 2 Id. at 175.
93 [1956] I.C.J. Rep. 77, 86.
94 Certain Expenses of the United Nations, [1962] I.C.J. Rep. 151, 155, quoting
from Interpretation of Peace Treaties (First Phase), [1950] I.C.J. Rep. 65, 71.
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made during the drafting of the Charter to place the ultimate
authority to interpret the Charter in the International Court
of Justice were not accepted; the opinion which the Court is
in the course of rendering is an advisory opinion. As
anticipated in 1945, therefore, each organ must, in the first
place at least, determine its own jurisdiction. If the Security
Council, for example, adopts a resolution purportedly for
the maintenance of international peace and security and if, in
accordance with a mandate or authorization in such resolu-
tion, the Secretary-General incurs financial obligations, these
amounts must be presumed to constitute "expenses of the
Organization." "5
B. Utilization of Advisory Decisions
It is possible to discover in these advisory opinions a fairly
definite trend, begun early and strengthened ever since, toward an
assumption of a broad competence to deal with an ever-increasing range
of problems arising from the process of claim in the context of a
global arena." Furthermore, these opinions reflect both an awareness
of the limited role ascribed to the Court by some other participants in
the process of decision and yet a commitment to use its limited oppor-
tunities to clarify community policies.
The major participants in the global power process to some extent
also appear to be ascribing to the Court at least part of the wider
competence it has been asserting. This is seen in the increasing num-
ber of member States filing briefs with the Court and in the increased
number making oral argument. 7  To illustrate, in the Expenses case
twenty States submitted written statements, and nine States 3s made
oral presentation,90 the greatest participation to date. Not only did
35 [1962] I.C.J. Rep. at 168. This relates to the finding that the General Assem-
bly had continually regarded the expenses as germane to the United Nations' major
purpose. See note 87 mupra.
96 With one notable exception (Eastern Carelia case) the advisory opinions of
the Permanent Court of International Justice, predecessor of the ICJ, on cursory
comparison seem to reflect a similar trend. From 1922 to 1935 the Permanent Court
handled twenty-seven advisory cases on a variety of problems. For a summary see
HUDSON, THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, 1920-1942, at 513-22
(1943). Two dissimilarities in experience of the two courts should be mentioned
here. It was the Council of the League, rather than the Assembly, which was the
leader in invoking the Court's advisory competence. And while then, as now, indi-
vidual States could not directly request an opinion of the Court, there were more
advisory cases submitted to the Permanent Court which dealt with disputes between
States. The record for voluntary compliance was also good. See id. at 513-22.
070Of course the variation in numbers may be partially explained by greater
interest in some cases than in others, but even so, the figures themselves suggest
that a substantial number of member States are not willing to sit by and let an
opinion issue without participating in argument.
98 Norway argued orally although it had not filed a written statement
09 See 1-4 CERTAIN EXPENSES OF THE UNITED NATIONS-PLEADINGS, ORAL ARGU-
MENTS, AND DOCUMENTS (I.CJ. 1962).
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an appreciably larger number make oral arguments than in any
previous case,100 but for the first time representatives of the Soviet
Union actually made an appearance before the Court.'0 '
It is not possible at this time, however, to report a similar re-
enforcing trend in another significant phase of the process of decision,
invocation of the Court's advisory competence. As already mentioned,
initiative here rests on the principal organs of the United Nations and
most of its specialized agencies-all composed of nation-states as con-
stituent members. In view of the great flow of events in these arenas
and among these member States,0 2 there have been remarkably few
requests for advisory opinions.
10 3
The responsibility for giving effective application to the au-
thoritative view enunciated by the Court rests with these same organs
and agencies, including-at least-a sufficient majority of their
member States. While these organs have apparently been reluctant on
occasion to invoke the advisory jurisdiction," 4 in general they have
followed the advisory decisions once given, although "several states
have refused to implement advisory opinions, on matters of close
concern to them, after opposing the request." ' The Assembly has,
at least, accepted by formal resolution each advisory opinion re-
ceived.10 6 On occasion it has gone further, for example, instructing
its special committee,10 7 condemning certain governments for failing to
100 See the table in ROSENNE, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 497 (1957).
01 Although the Soviet Union had taken the lead in refusing to pay its share
of the expenses incurred in the United Nations operations in question in the Expenses
case, giving them a prime interest in the advisory proceedings, they could have
ignored the proceedings, possibly with telling effect on the confidence in and of the
Court.
102 Reference here is both to the overall process of interaction as well as the
more "refined" process of claim and phases of the process of decision.
1
03 ROSENNE, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 496 (1957) ; accord, Gross,
Some Observations on the International Court of Justice, 56 Am. J. INT'L L. 33, 56
(1962).
104 While the advisory jurisdiction is invoked in the name of the Assembly, the
member States rather than the Assembly are represented before the Court. While
article 66 of the statute of the Court contemplates submissions or appearances by
"any international organization considered by the Court . . . as likely to furnish
information on the question," practice seems to limit this to the administrative type
case, for example, ILO Administrative Tribunal (UNESCO), [1955] I.C.J. Rep.
127, [1956] I.C.J. Rep. 77.
10 5 ROSENNE, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 495 (1957).
106 See, e.g., the resolutions accepting the advisory opinions rendered in the
South-West Africa cases. U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REC. l1th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 25
(A/3572) (1956-1957) ; U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 10th Sess., Supp. No. 19, at 19-20
(A/3116) (1955).
107 Resolution 620(A) instructing the Special Committee to follow the advis-
ory opinions of the Court in Competence of the Assembly Regarding Admission
of a State, [1950] I.C.J. Rep. 241-44. U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REC. 8th Sess., Supp.
No. 20, at 10 (A/2361) (1952).
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fulfill obligations confirmed by the Court,0 s or requesting the
Secretary-General to conform his practice to the Court's opinion.""
In one case an unsuccessful attempt was made to achieve direct im-
plementation by a member State."0
It is fair to conclude in light of this history that acceptance or
other effective recognition has had a high correlation to the general
expectations generated by the Court's opinions. Most recently, in the
highly charged Expenses case,"' the Assembly has accepted by resolu-
tion " the opinion of the Court. However, as the experience of the
South-West Africa case attests, difficult tests of effectiveness or enforce-
ment have not been passed. The South-West Africa case, however,
was not an optimal test, for the strategies available to achieve compli-
ance were unsuited to the task. A fairer evaluation is at this writing in
prospect. The Court's opinion in the Expenses case has been accepted
by the Assembly, and therefore every member able to do so must pay
the share of United Nations expenses allocated to it. Under article 19
of the charter a member in arrears in an amount equal to its con-
tribution for the preceding two years "shall have no vote in the
General Assembly." The Assembly has been asked to apply this
sanction .
3
A further question concerns the effect in law attributable to
advisory opinions. This question is traditionally dealt with in terms
of "binding force versus persuasive authority," or in equivalent lan-
guage. The inadequacy of such a formulation should be clear in light
of our analysis of the process of authoritative decision. Thus it would
be at best misleading to attempt a categorical answer to this question.
This prevalent verbal formulation cannot be ignored, for in fact it
constitutes a short-hand expression of common expectations about the
pertinent application of the Court's advisory opinions. The position
of the United States, as revealed in this passage from a recent state-
108 See, e.g., Interpretation of Peace Treaties, [1950] I.C.J. Rep. 65.
109 See, e.g., Reservations to the Convention on Genocide, [1951] I.C.J. Rep. 15.
110 International Status of South-West Africa, [1950] I.C.J. Rep. 128.
M'U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 17th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 54-55 (A/5217) (1962).
112 In the same resolution the Assembly providently re-established the Working
Group of Fifteen to consider methods of financing future United Nations peace-
keeping operations.
113 See Memorandum of Law on article 19 prepared by the Office of the Legal
Adviser, United States Department of State, of February 1964 in Contemporary
Practice of the U.S. Relating to International Law, 58 Am. J. INT'L L. 752, 753-78
(1964). Indeed, the American position is that application of the rule of article 19
"entails no decision of the General Assembly." Id. at 753. There is force in the
argument. But as the principal offenders are the Soviet Union and France, the
Assembly in all probability will have to consider the matter formally-particularly in
view of the Secretary-General's recently disclosed concern that if the Soviets lose
their vote, they might "walk-out." See N.Y. Times, Aug. 2, 1964, p. 1, col. 6;
note 128 infra.
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ment by Ambassador Klutznik before Committee V of the General
Assembly, is not atypical:
In both advisory and contentious cases the Court has de-
clared the law. The difference between a judgment in a
contentious case and an advisory opinion relates not to the
validity of the Court's statement of the law but to the obliga-
tions that flow from that statement. While an advisory
opinion does not have binding force, it does not follow that
it is not an authoritative statement of the law . . . . The
advisory opinion has no binding force because in advisory
proceedings there are no parties on whom the obligation
of compliance can be imposed. But this fact, as a leading
authority on the Court has said, "does not affect the quality
of the opiniox as an authoritative pronouncement of what
the law is." "4
The difficulty with such a formulation is its overly rigid concept of
"law" both as a set of abstract rules on the one hand and also as the
rules applied by elites to subjects." 5 This view of course fails to
take account of the interrelations of human institutions, while it places
undue emphasis on the formalities of organized society.",, Although
the principle of effectiveness thus continues to hold the focus of many
contemporary international lawyers, not surprisingly in view of their
experience with the systems of a well-organized territorial polity,"11
contemporary international lawyers and writers committed to demo-
114 Reprinted in Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to Inter-
national Law, 57 Am. J. INT'L L. 403, 423 (1963). The authority paraphrased must
have been RoSENNE, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 492-93 (1957). See
SCHWARZENBERGER, THE FRONTIERS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 305-06 (1962), for a
more conservative view that advisory opinions "have no legally binding force what-
soever," yet are entitled to "persuasive authority"-particularly when (and presum-
ably not "if") they are "well-reasoned." Compare STONE, LEGAL CONTROL OF INTER-
NATIONAL CONFLIcT 120-21 (1954), which places emphasis on the word advisory
but refers to prevailing practice of organs which is never squarely in conflict with
the Court's opinion. In accord is the view of Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice given
off-handedly in his separate opinion in the recent Expenses case, [1962] I.C.J. Rep.
151, 202-03.
Advisory opinions are sometimes said to be comparable in many respects to
"declaratory judgments of national law." Goodrich, The Nature of the Advisory
Opinions of the Permanent Court of International Justice, 32 Am. J. INT'L L. 738,
756 (1938). For a more cautious statement to the same effect, see ROSENNE, THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 459 n.2 (1957).
15 The attitude of the Soviet Union seems fairly to reflect a literal reading of
such formulations. As a Russian Embassy counsel once remarked to this writer
at a social gathering in Washington, "The Court's opinion [in the Expenses case]
is only an opinion and not a judgment directed against us."
116Little or no recognition is taken of what has been called the "contextual
character of human behavior." McDoUGAL & FELicIANo, LAW AND MINIMUM
WoRLD PUBLIC ORDER 343 (1961). Illustrative generalizations with supporting de-
tailed conditioning factors may be found in BERELsoN & STEINER, HUMAN BEHAVIOR,
AN INVENTORY OF ScIEN rIc FINDINGS (1964).
11"7 Cf. Lasswell & McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional
Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203 (1943).
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cratic values would not necessarily dissent from the overriding com-
munity policies clarified above.' 8
C. Factors Affecting Decisions
Low expectations of the possibility of implementing prescriptions
formulated by the Court in some measure doubtless discourage in-
vocation of the Court's competence. But other equally influential
factors appear to be operative in the invocation process, particularly
at the level where the formal decision is made to invoke the jurisdic-
tion. An examination of the position of the General Assembly is
illustrative."'
Prominent among predispositional factors 120 is the lack of
identification with the personnel of the Court by substantial numbers
of participants at the invoking level.' Also influential might be a
feeling of alienation from the participants within the invoking arena
itself, here the General Assembly.' Furthermore, there is a widespread
118 Significant indications of these attitudes appear in Gross, supra note 103, at 33.
119 It should be borne in mind that General Assembly delegates are not popularly
elected members of a constituent body like a national parliament who represent in
varying degrees their own predispositions as shaped of course by environmental factors
peculiarly identified with that territorial polity. Rather they are officials or agents
of the governments accredited to the United Nations. Obviously, therefore, complete
analysis on this point must take account of a larger number of individual participants
than those sitting at any given time in New York City.
120 The underlying proposition here is that every human act or group response
is a function not merely of environmental factors but also of predispositional factors.
LASSWELL & KAPLAN, POWER AND SociErY 5-6 (Yale Law School Studies No. 2,
1950).
The factors designated as predispositional include all conditions that relate
to the structures of perspectives which decision-makers . . . bring with them
to the making of choices about the implementation of minimal order and which
are externalized in such choices. These perspectives-the patterns of demand,
identification, and expectation-of [decision-makers] . . . like those of every
other individual, are channeled through and are continually being affected
and shaped by aggregates of factors that in shorthand reference may be
denominated as culture, class, interest, persoiwlity, and crisis factors.
McDOUGAL & FELICiANO, op. cit. supra note 116, at 334. A "thin" comprehensiveness
is here attempted, for obviously the task of collecting data about decision-makers in
one organ of the United Nations at any given time in the past with respect to any
single dispute--even if records were available-would be staggering.
121 E.g., the view of an Indian scholar that "there is need for a more adequate
representation of the Asian-African states on the Bench of the International Court."
Anand, Role of the "New" Asian-African Countries in the Present International
Legal Order, 56 Am. J. INT'L L. 383, 404 (1962). The need in this regard, it is
said, is not "cultural and legal" dispersion but "psychological"-a confidence-building
step. Id. at 404. Compare ROSENNE, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTIcE 14041
(1957): "Whereas previously the Court was essentially the reflection of European
legal philosophy, it has been a catalyst for fundamentally different legal cultures."
He notes that two places on the Court represent Islamic law; three represent Com-
munist law as new additions to the mixture; meanwhile common law and civil law
representation have held their own. See also STONE, op. cit. supra note 114, at 114.
122This is particularly evident when a new member seats its delegation, a
ceremony often accompanied by displays of national pride and folk identification-
as by the giving of speeches glorifying the transition from colonial status to inde-
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fear that by voting for inclusive prescription (i.e., for a resolution ask-
ing for an advisory opinion) or by initially moving to draft and con-
sider such a resolution (whether or not it is affirmatively approved) one
"big power" or another will be grievously offended.
2 3 This is a very
real concern where the great power can freely manipulate indulgences
and deprivations, as by increasing or decreasing foreign aid.'
Some of the more powerful major participants less rationally fear
that resort to third-party decision-making on questions of peculiar
interest to them 125 will result in similar undesirable indulgences or
deprivations. 20 This response appears unjustified where the differ-
ences are at a low level of intensity and are thus unlikely to lead to
violence in case of adverse decision, especially if the alternative is con-
tinued stalemate. Furthermore, in many such situations the change
in the status quo could bring about unforeseen advantages. 28 It need
hardly be said, additionally, that willingness to have inclusively pre-
scribed community policies invoked in these relatively "shallow" prob-
lems would conform to the expectation-itself in part generated by
earlier efforts of these major participants in composing the United
pendent statehood, wearing of tribal robes, etc. But among delegates themselves
there are signs of an increasing homogenization of personal tastes and habits with
perhaps an increasing internationalization of the perspectives involved. Of course
actual voting habits may be unchanged as a result of relatively tight control by the
foreign office back home, but certainly the opportunity for increased community
goal-thinking means a potential rise in readiness to consider a resolution seeking
invocation of community prescription by the Court.
123 During the Korean action Syria and India expressed fears in Assembly debate
that passage of a resolution condemning the People's Republic of China as an ag-
gressor would not end hostilities but extend and expand them. [1951] UNrr=n
NATioNs YEAR BooK 218-19.
124 E.g., the Aswan Dam project in Egypt.
125 Here the main features of culture, class, interest, etc. can be seen applied to
nonindividual participants. For example, it is felt in some quarters that one principal
reason for Afro-Asian countries' reluctance to accede to third-party competence to
decide their disputes with Western nations is that they occupy a debtor position
vis-a-vis the respondent nation-states. See Anand, supra note 121, at 400-03; Stone,
A Common Law for Mankind?, 1 INT'L STUDiEs 430-31 (1959).
126E.g., Soviet fears about United Nations expenses; United States fears about
the admission to membership of the People's Republic of China. Indonesia's alleged
fear of Malaysia, purportedly underlying her objection to the temporary seating of
Malaysia on the Security Council, can only partially explain Indonesia's announced
decision to withdraw from the United Nations. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1965,
p. 3, col. 4.
127 For example, the United States would not likely resort to intensive coercion
merely because Communist China were admitted to the United Nations.
128 E.g., the ability to focus energies or allocate additional resources to other
areas; or the opportunity to appear in the role of peace-maker by ultimate compliance.
For example, if and when the Soviets pay their United Nations assessments, there
will be a general concensus that a "lessening of tensions" has taken place. The
Soviets possibly may do this, perhaps in the form of some sort of "donation" to the
treasury of the United Nations. As of this writing there is evidence of mounting
pressure on the "delinquents" by smaller nations to make some payments to avoid
a direct clash. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1965, p. 5, col. 3.
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Nations Charter, etc.-that disputes would increasingly be resolved
by resort to international tribunals.
On the other hand there are situations in which it is not at all
reasonable to expect major participants not to oppose efforts for a
third-party decision. These are the disputes which have risen in
intensity of potential commitment (through all types of strategies, in-
cluding the military) to the level of imminent violence or intense
coercion constituting, in the view of the major participant, a severe
threat to its security. Notable examples in the recent past include
the Hungarian revolution of 1956 and the American limited quarantine
of Cuba in 1962.29 As the problems shade away from this end of the
power spectrum, it becomes more reasonable to expect major par-
ticipants to oppose less and less, if not indeed actively seek, the in-
vocation of inclusively prescribed policies to resolve every kind of
dispute, not alone those of prime significance to international organiza-
tions themselves.'30
At least two environmental factors "' also seem in some measure
to explain the rarity of decision-makers' invocation of the Court's
advisory competence: the absence in the arena of the General Assembly
of a guiding "executive" leadership such as is found in comparable
bodies in internal arenas (Parliaments and Congresses) and the re-
liance placed on other modalities (particularly the traditional diplo-
matic and ideological) to bring about peaceful resolution of disputes
and inchoate disputes."n
M A more recent example is the first Gulf of Tonkin incident (North Vietnamese
torpedo boats attacking a single U.S. destroyer) in August of 1964. On the Cuba
quarantine see AmmucAN Soc'y OF INTERNATIONAL LAW PROCEEDINGS 164-65 (1963)
(Remarks of Professor McDougal) ; Malison, Limited Naval Blockade or Quarantine-
Interdiction: National and Collective Defense Claims Valid under International Law,
31 GE-o. WAsH. L. Rxv. 335 (1962).
130The list of potential problems of general community concern is long, varied,
and of course speculative. For example, validity of future financing plans for the
United Nations, election and succession of the Secretary-General and proposals to
make that office over into a multi-individual one, sanctions against member States
not complying with community prescriptions, possible sanctions against nonmember
States. In this latter connection see the interesting suggestion of such strategies in
Falk & Mendlovitz, Toward a Warless World: One Legal Formula to Achieve
Transition, 73 YALE L.J. 399 (1964). Other possibilities for third-party adjudication
might include: interpretation of trade agreements, special "appeals" from bloc or
regional associations; the validity and effect of Assembly "recognition" of one regime
over another in areas of international instability like the Congo. Perhaps a multi-
partite settlement of the future status of Cyprus, a possibility at this writing, could
be reviewed in some unexpected future context as, for example, the respective rights
and obligations of Greece and Turkey.
131In widest compass these embrace all the component features of world power
processes already briefly discussed. More narrowly here the discussion relates to
those factors of more direct significance to the process of decision. See note 120 supra.
l2As the conclusion indicates, this should not be taken as a preference for the
newer, more inclusive modality suggested by increasing resort to the Court's advisory
competence.
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IV. CONCLUSION
If our goal is a more peaceful and secure public order in the
world community, one in which there is at least a decreasing resort to
intense coercion and an increasing resort to modalities of persuasion
and an increasing employment of third-party decision-making within
community-wide structures of authority, it is possible to be optimistic
in one respect about the trends previously described. The community
tribunal of the International Court of Justice has developed through its
advisory opinions a willingness to undertake problems from the other
structures of authority in the world organization which require the
deliberate, rational, and informed consideration of a relatively small
group of learned men. The problems themselves seem to be of in-
creasing pertinence to the mainstream of international organizational
development, the answers of growing impact in international law
generally. And there is no reason now to suggest that the Court
will retreat from this advanced position.
The corollary trend to invoke the Court's advisory competence,
to the extent it exists at all, is slower and less dynamic, strikingly so
in comparison with the variety and number of issues or potential issues
arising in the larger context of interaction and out of the world power
process. In view of the limitations inherent in the structures of au-
thority where this decision has to be formally taken and the other
factors affecting decision at this state, it seems doubtful that the im-
mediate future will witness any radical change in this trend. In all
likelihood the General Assembly, and more rarely a specialized agency,
will infrequently (perhaps once every two years) call for advisory
opinions. While there will be variety in the background of the ques-
tions submitted (in time, place, circumstance, and procedural context,
etc.), most of them will be concerned with problems peculiar to the
United Nations, or its associated agencies. More rarely will a de-
cision be called for on questions dealing with relations between the
organization and constituent member States.
133
If instead of allowing passive trends to take their natural courses
decision-makers in the appropriate structures of authority undertake
deliberately to encourage resort to the Court's advisory competence,
the result is likely to be more in accord with the clarified goals of the
world community. To this end decision-makers might involve the
Court more routinely in the affairs of the world organization, its
133 The Assembly's action following the Expenses case should be helpful, at
least cathartically in this respect, although it probably will not decisively move the
trend one way or another.
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associated agencies, and ultimately its constituent members as a timely
means of settling divisive issues which might lead to disputes of greater
intensity likely to disrupt the peace. No structural changes are a
prerequisite to this increased usage, although some eventual con-
sideration will probably have to be given to a wider representative
composition of the Court itself."' In the more immediate future the
lead in the direction recommended will probably have to be taken by
"western countries." 135 In the longer term, however, most major
participants probably could not afford to thwart the rising expectation
that disputes, particularly of the subcrisis level, will be submitted for
authoritative prescription. Although from that point in time it may
not be important to recall the genesis of the prevailing practice, the
Court's own earlier assertion of wider, more inclusive competence may
prove to have provided a modest foreshadowing.
In my opinion the positive trend discovered in the advisory
opinions of the Court should be encouraged as a policy alternative.
The dispute-settling machinery of the contemporary world arena is too
meagre to allow additional possibilities to go unnoticed. Nor are
the pitfalls to be ignored. Of course there is a real chance that dis-
putants will flaunt the community tribunal's decision, leaving the
facts unchanged. This is no less true in other, better organized arenas.
Development of adequate sanction techniques, it would seem, need not
be prior in time or in principle.
The realistic alternatives to a policy of encouraging the use of
advisory opinions for peaceful dispute settlement, a policy recommenda-
tion aimed primarily at the members and their representatives in the
United Nations General Assembly, are at least two in number. We
may reject the negative one of attempting to discourage the use of
advisory opinions as being regressive or past-oriented. The other
possibility would seem to be to say and do nothing specifically with
reference to the advisory competence and particular world problems,
that is "to let nature take its course." In the contemporary context,
where authoritative settlement is the exception rather than the rule,
this is a self-defeating policy, for it assumes no postulated goal but the
status quo and comprehends no modality but indifference. If rational
policy alternatives are not employed as they are available, the commit-
ment to overriding goals can more easily be challenged.
134 See note 121 supra and accompanying text.
135 "The future flow of cases depends, in realistic terms, upon disputes between
members of the Free World being steered in the direction of the Court." Gross,
mpra note 103, at 61.
